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Constitutional Cases 2005:
An Overview
Patrick J. Monahan* and Christian Kurtz**

These volumes of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consist of
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Ninth Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 28, 2006, examine the
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the
calendar year 2005.1 The court handed down a total of 89 judgments in
2005,2 29 (or 33 per cent) of which were constitutional cases. In a
departure from previous years, only one-half of the constitutional
decisions this year were Charter challenges,3 the other half being divided
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1
A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 19952005, available online at <http://www.scc.csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat4_e.asp>.
3
Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141
[hereinafter “Montreal”]; Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 791 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]; Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v.
Quebec (Attorney General); Zorrilla v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 257 [hereinafter “Okwuobi”]; Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005]
S.C.J. No. 15, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238 [hereinafter “Gosselin”]; Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 14, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201 [hereinafter “Solski”]; UL Canada Inc. v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”];
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 [hereinafter
“Toronto Star”]; R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 [hereinafter
“Pires”]; R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 [hereinafter “Spence”]; R. v.
Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 [hereinafter “Henry”]; Medovarski v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 31, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 [hereinafter
“Medovarski”]; R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter
“Orbanski”]; R. v. Chow, [2005] S.C.J. No. 22, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 384 [hereinafter “Chow”]; R. v.
Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895 [hereinafter “Wiles”]; R. v. C. (D.), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 [hereinafter “C. (D.)”].
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between federalism issues (eight cases),4 Aboriginal issues (two cases),5
and five other constitutional cases.6

I. CHARTER CASES
In purely statistical terms, the Court did not appear to be particularly
receptive to Charter claims in 2005, with only three out of 15 (or 20 per
cent) of Charter claims succeeding. This is somewhat of a departure
from recent experience under the McLachlin Court; in each of the three
previous years, more than one-half of the Charter claims considered by
the Court were successful.7 Nevertheless, while in percentage terms the
Court may have appeared unreceptive to Charter claims in 2005, by far
the most significant decision of the year was Chaoulli, where the Court
boldly and unexpectedly struck down provisions in Quebec law
prohibiting the sale of private health insurance. What was particularly
remarkable about Chaoulli was the willingness of the Court to overturn
a key provision of an important statute dealing with social policy, an
area where the Court has traditionally been extremely deferential to the
executive and legislative branches. Without a doubt, Chaoulli was the
most significant constitutional case of the year, and potentially of the
entire decade.

4

British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 473 [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”]; Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss.
22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Reference re EIA”]; Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”];
Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870 [hereinafter “Castillo”]; Kirkbi AG v.
Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 [hereinafter “Kirkbi”]; Fédération
des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292
[hereinafter “Pelland”]; Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”]; UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”].
5
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 [hereinafter “Mikisew”]; R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J.
No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [hereinafter “Marshall”].
6
Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] S.C.J. No. 28, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667
[hereinafter “Vaid”]; Provincial Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of
Justice); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence
des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005]
S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges”].
7
See Patrick J. Monahan & Nadine Blum, “Constitutional Cases 2002: An Overview”
(2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1; Jamie Cameron & Patrick J. Monahan, “Constitutional Cases 2003: An
Overview” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1; Patrick J. Monahan & Evan Van Dyk, “Constitutional Cases
2004: An Overview” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1.
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1. Chaoulli and the Future of Health Care
The Chaoulli decision has proven tremendously controversial among
commentators, with the Court being criticized for having entrenched a
“two-tier” system of health care in Canada.8 In fact, however, I believe
that much of this criticism has resulted from a misreading of the Court’s
judgment and is misplaced.9 In my view, the Court does not mandate a
particular organization of the health care system but, instead, merely
indicates that there are legal limits to the length of time that patients can
be expected to wait for care in the context of a universal health care
system. All the Court has required, in other words, is that if the
government wishes to maintain a universal public health care system
and continue to preclude a parallel private system it can do so, provided
that it ensures timely access to medically necessary care.
At issue in Chaoulli were provisions in Quebec legislation which
prohibited anyone from contracting for private insurance for a service
that was available through the public system, and which prohibited
payment for services that were insured hospital services.10 Dr. Jacques
Chaoulli, a doctor who wanted to offer private health services, and
George Zeliotis, a Quebec patient who had been on a waiting list for hip
replacement surgery, challenged these provisions on the basis that they
violated their rights to life, liberty and security of the person guaranteed
by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Right and Freedoms.11
Although the majority of the Supreme Court upheld these claims,
the Court did so on the basis of an argument that was somewhat more
limited than that advanced by the appellants Chaoulli and Zeliotis. In
particular, the Court did not accept the argument to the effect that the
Charter guarantees an individual the right to choose between a public
and a private provider of health care. Nor did the Court rule that there
was a constitutional right to the establishment of a parallel privately
funded health care system. Rather, the focus of the two majority
8
See, for example, Sujit Choudhry, “Worse than Lochner?”, in Colleen Flood, Kent
Roach & Lorne Sossin, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate over Health Care in
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2005), at 75; Allan Hutchinson, “Condition Critical: The
Constitution & Health Care”, in Flood, Roach and Sossin, id., at 101.
9
I acknowledge that I acted as co-counsel in Chaoulli to the group of senators, led by
Senators Michael Kirby and Marjory LeBreton, who intervened in the case.
10
See s. 15 of the Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29 and s. 11 of the Hospital
Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28.
11
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
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judgments in the Supreme Court was on the lack of timely care in the
public health care system.
The fundamental issue that was raised by the Court was whether it
is constitutionally justifiable for governments to legislatively preclude a
patient from seeking access to necessary medical treatment, when such
treatment is not available in a timely manner in the public system.
According to the judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Major J., the key
difficulty is that the government and legislature established a monopoly
on the provision of health care services and then failed to deliver care in
a timely fashion:
By imposing exclusivity and then failing to provide public health care
of a reasonable standard within a reasonable time, the government
creates circumstances that trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter
… The state has effectively limited access to private health care except
for the very rich, who can afford private care without need of
insurance. This virtual monopoly, on the evidence, results in delays in
treatment that adversely affect the citizen’s security of the person.
Where a law adversely affects life, liberty or security of the person, it
must conform to the principles of fundamental justice. This law, in our
view, fails to do so.12

Later in the judgment, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. note that the
question in the case is not whether single-tier health care is preferable to
two-tier care. They further note that the prohibition on obtaining private
health insurance might well be justifiable in circumstances where health
care services are reasonable as to both quality and timeliness. But these
prohibitions cannot be sustained where care is not being delivered in a
reasonable and timely manner: “if the government chooses to act, it
must do so properly.”13
Similarly, Deschamps J. frames the question before the Court as
being “whether Quebeckers who are prepared to spend money to get
access to health care that is, in practice, not accessible in the public
sector because of waiting lists may be validly prevented from doing so
by the state”. 14 Justice Deschamps acknowledges that the government
12

Chaoulli, supra, note 3, at paras. 105-106.
Id., at paras. 108 and 158.
14
Id., at para. 4. It should be noted that Deschamps J. based her analysis on s. 9.1 of the
Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 and therefore did not find it
necessary to rule on the question of whether the prohibitions in Quebec law were inconsistent with
the Canadian Charter. Nevertheless, the reasoning and analysis in her judgment are equally
applicable to the Canadian Charter and, indeed, mirror precisely the analysis and conclusions of
McLachlin C.J. and Major J.
13
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has the right to discourage the emergence of a parallel private health
care system, but that the issue raised is excessive waiting times:
… when my colleagues ask whether Quebec has the power under the
Constitution to discourage the establishment of a parallel private
health care system, I can only agree with them that it does. But that is
not the issue in the appeal. The appellants do not contend that they
have a constitutional right to private insurance. Rather, they contend
that the waiting times violate their rights to life and security. It is the
measure chosen by the government that is in issue, not Quebeckers’
need for a public health care system. 15

A variety of arguments were raised in support of the prohibitions on
access to private care. One such argument was that the prohibitions were
necessary in order to prevent the emergence of a parallel private system,
since such a parallel system would then drain off human resources from
the public plan as many physicians and other health care professionals
left the public plan. This could lead to increased waiting times in the
public plan and diminish the quality of care available to those who were
not in a position to afford private insurance.
There were a number of clear answers to this argument. The first,
and perhaps most obvious, was that the government was perfectly
entitled to maintain the existing prohibitions and to suppress the
emergence of a parallel private health care system, provided that it
ensured that medically necessary care was available in the public system
in a reasonably timely manner. What the government cannot do is
attempt to have it both ways: it cannot legally require Canadians to
access health care through a single-payer public system, and then fail to
provide the care needed when Canadians are sick. As noted above, this
was precisely the argument advanced by McLachlin C.J. and Major J.,
as well as by Deschamps J.
Further, where the government seeks to justify a measure as a
“reasonable limitation” under section 1 of the Charter, it is common for
the courts to consider whether a similar limit has been enacted in other
countries with analogous political and legal systems. In the event that
other analogous jurisdictions have not enacted the prohibition(s) in
issue, this is usually regarded as evidence that the measure cannot be
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” since there are
other alternatives available to achieve the desired objective(s). In
15

Id., at para. 14.
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Chaoulli both the majority judgments pointed out that very few
jurisdictions have attempted to totally ban individuals from using their
own resources to access medically necessary care, and yet these
jurisdictions had properly functioning universal health care systems.
Thus it can hardly be maintained that the prohibitions in question
represent a minimal impairment of the rights of individuals who are
forced to wait for medically necessary care in circumstances that can
cause severe physical and psychological harm and even death.
When members of the Supreme Court of Canada disagree with each
other, they normally do so in measured and polite tones. Not so in
Chaoulli, where Binnie and LeBel JJ. issued a blistering dissent in the
combative style more commonly associated with the U.S. Supreme
Court. The dissenters charge that the majority judgments had proceeded
on the basis of wholly political rather than legal argument. First, even
conceding that waiting may constitute a problem for “some Quebeckers
in some circumstances”,16 there was no systematic evidence about the
extent of wait times and, in any event, it was beyond the expertise of
judges to determine what was a reasonable wait for care. “How many
MRIs does the Constitution require?”, they ask rhetorically.17
Second, they point out that there was extensive evidence at trial
supporting the conclusion that a “U.S. two-tier system of health
coverage” would have a negative impact on wait times in the public
system. For example, there was evidence from other jurisdictions
suggesting that parallel private insurers would “skim the cream” by
siphoning off high-income patients while shying away from patients
who constitute a higher financial risk, with the result that the public
system would carry a disproportionate burden of patients considered
high risk. Even if this evidence was contested or controversial, it had
been accepted by the trial judge, who had concluded that the creation of
a parallel private system would harm the public system. In Binnie and
LeBel JJ.’s view, the Supreme Court of Canada ought to defer to
governments and legislatures, as well as to the trial judge, on these
complex policy matters.
Significantly, Binnie and LeBel JJ. did not provide a response to the
principled argument in the majority judgments that if a government
wishes to establish a monopoly over the provision of certain medically

16
17

Id., at para. 207 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 163.
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necessary services, it thereby comes under an obligation to provide care
in a timely manner. It is certainly true, as the dissenting justices suggest
with their rhetorical question regarding MRIs, that the determination of
reasonable waiting times requires a difficult exercise of judgment. But
the fact that such a determination is difficult does not mean that
governments and health care administrators should thereby be relieved
of any obligation to provide care in a timely manner. By way of
analogy, the fact that it may be difficult to determine what constitutes an
acceptable speed on a highway does not mean that governments would
thereby be justified in abolishing speed limits. Of course, just as speed
limits on the highways are fixed by traffic experts rather than the courts,
the determination of acceptable wait times must be made by qualified
medical professionals rather than judges; what the courts can mandate is
simply that there must be enforceable limits on waiting time determined
by qualified medical professionals, if the state wishes to establish a
universal, single-payer delivery model and prohibit individuals from
accessing private care.
What is the significance of the fact that Chaoulli was a 4-3 decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada, with one of the members of the
majority (Deschamps J.) relying on the Quebec Charter of human rights
and freedoms18 to strike down the Quebec legislation, and declining to
rule on the issue of whether the impugned legislation also violated the
Canadian Charter? In this sense, the six members of the Supreme Court
who dealt with the Canadian Charter split 3-3 on the issue of whether
the Quebec legislation violated the Canadian Charter. Could it therefore
be argued that the principle of patient accountability which I have
outlined in this paper applies only in the province of Quebec, and that it
remains an open question as to whether the Supreme Court’s principled
approach applies in the other provinces and territories?
In fact, I do not believe that this outcome is either legally or
politically sustainable. First, while it is true that Deschamps J. relied
upon the Quebec Charter rather than the Canadian Charter to rule the
impugned provisions to be invalid, the arguments she utilized were
identical to those adopted by McLachlin C.J. and Major J. in their
Charter analysis, and were diametrically opposed to the position of
dissenting Justices Binnie and LeBel. Thus, while her judgment was
technically limited to the Quebec Charter, it is legally implausible to

18

R.S.Q. c. C-12.
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read her reasoning as supporting a different conclusion under the
Canadian Charter.
More fundamentally, post-Chaoulli it is simply not sustainable
politically for political leaders outside of Quebec to suggest that their
citizens lack basic rights to timely care that are available in Quebec. In
fact, the political discussions that have occurred over the past year have
implicitly accepted that the result in Chaoulli applies across the country,
rather than in a single province.19 There is strong popular support for
Chaoulli in all provinces and across all income and age groups20 and,
with the aging of the population, political pressure and demand for
timely medical care will only increase rather than diminish.
2. Other Successful Charter Cases
There were two other successful Charter cases in 2005, Solski21 and
Toronto Star.22 In Solski, the court used section 23 of the Charter to
“read down” the requirement in section 73 of the Quebec Charter of the
French language,23 which limited access to English-language education
in Quebec to those children who had received the “major part” of their
education in English; the Court held that children who had received a
“substantial part” of (rather than a “majority of”) their education in the
minority language should be deemed to satisfy the “major part”
requirement in section 73 of the Charter of the French language. This
narrowing of section 73 would not appear to have a material impact on
access to English-language education in Quebec. The Toronto Star case
affirmed that once executed, search warrants are presumptively public
documents absent serious risk to the administration of justice, and that
the Dagenais/Mentuck test24 remains the appropriate means of applying
this criterion. This carried forward the principle recognized in other

19
Thus in the discussions in the health policy community in recent months, health care
administrators have accepted that they are bound to respond to Chaoulli and have discussed the
ways in which this is occurring in all provinces and territories. See, for example, Brian Postl, Final
Report of the Federal Advisor on Wait Times (June 2006) available at: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca>.
20
See, for example, Ipsos-Reid, “Canadian Views on Health Care Scenarios” (June 7,
2006), available at: <http://www.ipsos-na.com>.
21
Supra, note 3.
22
Supra, note 3.
23
R.S.Q., c. C-11.
24
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [2005] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835;
R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442.
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cases to the effect that court proceedings and documents are
presumptively open to public scrutiny.
3. Unsuccessful Charter Cases
There were a total of 11 decisions where Charter claims failed in 2005.
Seven of these were criminal cases involving: RIDE programs; 25 the
admissibility of wiretap evidence;26 the right to challenge jurors for
racial bias;27 the right to cross-examine affiants in wiretap
authorizations;28 the cross-examination of accused on prior inconsistent
statements;29 and a mandatory firearm prohibition order in the Criminal
Code.30 Charter claims also failed in two freedom of expression cases,31
an immigration case involving a section 7 claim,32 and a section 23 case
from Quebec.33 The latter case, Gosselin, was significant in that it

25

C. (D.), supra, note 3: First Nations constables may set up RIDE programs outside
reserves; therefore, the accused was not arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9. Orbanski, supra, note
3: Police may question motorists about their drinking and administer roadside screening device
tests without providing the opportunity to retain counsel — this limit on s. 10(b) is justified under s.
1.
26
Chow, supra, note 3: Wiretap evidence is admissible (in accordance with s. 8) despite
the fact that the accused was not “named” in wiretap authorizations. Further, the accused is not
entitled to a separate trial to compel co-accused to testify.
27
Spence, supra, note 3: Counsel for the accused does not have a right to challenge jurors
on the basis of sympathy for the race of the victim of the alleged crime.
28
Pires, supra, note 3: Affirms the right to cross-examine the affiant in proceedings to
obtain wiretap authorization subject to Garofoli test (reasonable likelihood that cross-examination
will elicit evidence of probative value) [R. v. Garofoli, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
1421].
29
Henry, supra, note 3: Section 13 does not preclude cross-examination of the accused on
prior inconsistent statements based on voluntary testimony from an earlier trial on the same
indictment; s. 13 only applies to compelled testimony.
30
Wiles, supra, note 3: The mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition required by s. 109(1)
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 does not constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment and
therefore does not violate s. 12.
31
UL Canada, supra, note 3: Provincial legislation regulating the colour of margarine does
not limit freedom of expression; Montreal (City), supra, note 3: Noise by-law limits freedom of
expression but is justified under s. 1.
32
Medovarski, supra, note 3: In cases where an individual is convicted of a serious crime,
the removal of the right of appeal against a deportation order does not violate s. 7; deportation of a
non-citizen does not in itself violate s. 7.
33
Gosselin, supra, note 3: Claim that s. 73 of the Quebec Charter of the French language,
which provides access to English-language schools under certain circumstances, is discriminatory;
parents who were part of the French-speaking majority wanted their children to attend Englishlanguage schools. The Court held that this was beyond the purpose of s. 23 of the Charter; if
accepted, this argument would effectively eliminate the compromise contained in s. 23.
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clarified that minority-language education rights in Quebec do not
extend to French-speaking parents in Quebec.

II. FEDERALISM CASES
The court handed down decisions on eight federalism cases in 2005 and
in all of these cases the constitutional challenge or claim was
unsuccessful. Imperial Tobacco34 and Rothmans35 saw challenges to the
provincial regulation of the tobacco industry turned back, while
Reference re EIA36 saw federal maternity and parental leave benefits
upheld.
The Imperial Tobacco case was particularly significant. First, it
clarified the Court’s approach to the interpretation of the “in the
province” requirement in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1982. At
issue in the case was the validity of a provincial statute which made
extra-provincial manufacturers of tobacco products liable for health care
costs incurred in British Columbia in respect of tobacco-related
diseases. It was argued that the law was directed at matters outside the
province of British Columbia, since the head offices and decisionmaking of the tobacco manufacturers were located outside B.C. The
Court rejected this challenge, however, noting that there were strong
relationships among the enacting territory (British Columbia), the
subject matter of the law (compensation for the government of British
Columbia’s tobacco-related health care costs) and the persons made
subject to it (the tobacco manufacturers ultimately responsible for those
costs). Further, the Act respected the legislative sovereignty of other
jurisdictions. This was because the cause of action related to

34
Supra, note 4: The Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C.
2000, c. 30 authorizes the government of British Columbia to bring an action against tobacco
manufacturers to recover health care costs. This Act was held to be a constitutionally valid exercise
of provincial power because it is meaningfully connected to the province and there are strong
relationships among the enacting territory, the subject matter and the persons to whom it applies.
35
Rothmans, supra, note 4: Provincial legislation banning the display of tobacco products
is not inconsistent with a federal provision allowing the display; the federal provision merely
circumscribes a more general prohibition in federal law and is not frustrated by the application of
provincial law.
36
Supra, note 4: Challenge to ss. 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996,
c. 23 as valid exercise of federal power — the Act was held to be constitutional. The pith and
substance of both parental and maternity benefits is to provide replacement income during an
interruption of employment; replacement income falls under Parliament’s jurisdiction granted in s.
91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
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expenditures by the government of British Columbia for the health care
of British Columbians. No other jurisdiction could possibly assert a
stronger connection to that cause of action than British Columbia. Thus
the Act could apply to tobacco manufacturers even though their
corporate decision-makers and manufacturing facilities might be located
outside the province.
An additional challenge to the legislation in Imperial Tobacco was
based on the fact that it applied retroactively, and it conferred certain
advantages or established certain presumptions in favour of the Crown
in proceedings brought under the Act. It was argued that these features
of the legislation were inconsistent with the principle of the rule of law,
which was said to require that legislation be prospective and general,
and that legislation not confer special advantages on the government.
The Supreme Court noted that there was no constitutional requirement
of prospectivity or generality in legislation, nor was it improper for
legislation to confer special advantages on the government. The Court
also commented more generally on the appropriateness of seeking to
challenge legislation on the basis of the principle of the rule of law:
The rule of law is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the
Constitution’s written terms. Nor is it a tool by which to avoid
legislative initiatives of which one is not in favour. On the contrary, it
requires that courts give effect to the Constitution’s text, and apply, by
whatever its terms, legislation that conforms to that text.37

One might have thought that these comments would close the door
to future litigation on the basis of the constitutional principle of the “rule
of law”.38 It should be noted, however, that the British Columbia Court
of Appeal has subsequently ruled that it is possible to utilize the
principle of the rule of law to challenge legislation which limits the
access of citizens to the courts.39 Thus it would be premature to conclude
that Imperial Tobacco has completely closed the door to challenges to the

37

Imperial Tobacco, supra, note 4, at para. 67.
See also Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
3 at 29; Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp., [1999] S.J. No. 302, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 51
(C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied June 1, 2000.
39
See Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2006] B.C.J. No. 252, 263 D.L.R.
(4th) 582 (C.A.) (holding that a tax on legal services that had the effect of reducing citizen access to
the courts was invalid as offending the principle of the rule of law, despite the Supreme Court
ruling in Imperial Tobacco).
38

14

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

validity of legislation based on the principle of rule of law, although
certainly the case narrows the width of any opening that might remain.

III. ABORIGINAL CASES
Two Aboriginal cases reached the Supreme Court in 2005, Mikisew40
and Marshall.41 In Mikisew, the Crown failed to discharge its “obligation
to consult” under section 35 when it unilaterally declared that a winter
road would be shifted from reserve land to a track along its boundary.
However, the court emphasized that the Crown’s duty in this case was
relatively low and could be discharged by limited consultation in the
future.
Marshall is an important decision because it affirms that Aboriginal
title requires proof of exclusive occupation. The trial judges in this
litigation42 had required proof of regular and exclusive use of the
relevant lands to establish Aboriginal title. The Courts of Appeal held
that this test was too strict and applied a less onerous standard of
incidental or proximate occupancy. The Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed that the approaches taken by the trial judges were correct,
distinguishing claims of Aboriginal rights from those of title. Aboriginal
title requires proof of Aboriginal practices that indicate possession
similar to that associated with title at common law. The Court
emphasized that such a determination must be made taking into account
the Aboriginal perspective, and noted that exploiting the land, rivers or
seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into
Aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently regular and
exclusive to comport with title at common law. However, the Court also
found that more typically, seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised
in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right rather than
title. In this case, the trial judges had concluded that there was
insufficient evidence of exclusive possession of the particular areas over
which title was being claimed, and there was no claim advanced on the
basis of an Aboriginal right to engage in particular activities. Therefore

40

Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 5.
42
Although the Court issued a single judgment, it decided two separate cases, R. v.
Marshall, arising from Nova Scotia, and R. v. Bernard, arising from New Brunswick; there were
two separate trials and court of appeal decisions.
41
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the Supreme Court reversed the Courts of Appeal and restored the trial
judgments.

IV. OTHER CASES
There were a total of four cases dealing with judicial compensation in
2005, three of which were unsuccessful.43 The Court clarified the fact
that recommendations of salary review commissions are advisory rather
than binding, and that the government could depart from these advisory
committee recommendations if this is justified with “rational” reasons;
this low threshold should be easy to meet and should therefore
discourage litigation over judicial salaries in the future. In fact, although
the claim advanced by the Quebec judges succeeded, the Court in effect
provided a “road map” for provinces wishing to depart from future
commission recommendations.44

V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
cases in 2005 was the high degree of unanimity among members of the
Court. The Court was unanimous in 25 of the 29 constitutional cases (86
per cent), which is the highest rate of unanimity in the last decade.45 Five
members of the court (McLachlin C.J., Major, Deschamps, Abella and
Charron JJ.) did not dissent in a single constitutional case in 2005. In
fact, the only closely divided decision in 2005 was Chaoulli, where the
Court split 3-3 on the application of the Canadian Charter, with
Deschamps J.’s ruling that the legislation at issue violated the Quebec
Charter proving decisive. In the other 14 Charter cases, there were only
two cases that featured dissents, Orbanski, where LeBel and Fish JJ.
dissented in a 7-2 decision holding that police may question motorists
about their drinking and administer roadside screening without
providing access to counsel; and Montréal, where Binnie J. dissented in
a 6-1 decision upholding the application of a municipal noise by-law.
The only other dissent in the 2005 constitutional decisions came in
Castillo, where the Court, by an 8-1 margin, upheld the application of a

43
44
45

Supra, note 6.
Provincial Judges, supra, note 6.
Supra, note 2.
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provision in Alberta’s Limitations Act46 over the dissent of Bastarache J.
on federalism grounds. Of particular significance was the unanimity in
the two Aboriginal cases, particularly the important Marshall case
clarifying the application of the doctrine of Aboriginal title.
It is evident that the current Court has managed to achieve a
relatively unusual degree of consensus. Moreover, the membership of
the Court is likely to remain stable for the foreseeable future; although
Rothstein J. joined the Court in early 2006, there are no additional
retirements mandated until November 2013, when Fish J. reaches the
mandatory retirement age of 75. Barring an unforeseen change in the
interim, the current degree of consensus among the members of the
Supreme Court of Canada may well be maintained for some time to
come.
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R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12.

